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Abstract. Psychosocial constructs can only be assessed indirectly, and measures are typically 
formed by a combination of indicators that are thought to relate to the construct. Reflective and 
formative measurement models offer different conceptualizations of the relation between the 
indicators and what is often a univariate latent variable supposed to correspond in some way to 
the construct. In this paper, a causal interpretation is proposed of associations between 
constructed measures and various outcomes that is applicable to both reflective and formative 
models and is moreover applicable even if the usual assumptions of these models are violated 
such that the indicators have causal efficacy, rather than the supposed underlying latent. The 
interpretative approach is illustrated using associations between measures of social integration 
and cardiovascular disease incidence, concerning which neither the formative nor the reflective 
models seem adequate. It is argued that formative models misconstrue the relationship between 
the constructed measures and the underlying reality by which causal processes operate, but that 
reflective models misconstrue the nature of the underlying reality itself by typically presuming 
that the constituents of it that are causally efficacious are unidimensional. The ensuing problems 
arising from these misconstruals are discussed. An outline for a new model of the process of 
measure construction is put forward. Discussion is given to the practical implications of these 
observations and proposals for the provision of definitions, the selection of items, item-by-item 
analyses, the construction of measures, and the interpretation of the associations of these 























The model that dominates classical approaches to measurement and scale development, 
sometimes referred to as a reflective model, presupposes an underlying univariate latent variable 
that gives rise to measured indicators.1-4 The latent variable is typically thought to correspond to 
some psychosocial construct of interest. It is typically assumed that the underlying latent variable 
has causal efficacy,4,5 even though all we observe are its indicators. 
In this paper, I will employ recently developed theory for causal inference for multiple 
version of treatment (MVT)6,7 to explore alternative interpretations of exposure-outcome 
associations when the exposure variable used is an index or scale. I will show that the proposed 
interpretation under MVT theory holds both under what are referred to in the literature as 
reflective and formative models, and holds yet more generally still.8-13 I will present some 
empirical data and theoretical considerations that challenges whether either reflective or 
formative models are adequate. I will furthermore present an alternative, and I believe more 
adequate, model concerning the relationships between constructs, indicators, measures, and the 
true underlying constituents of reality, and I will discuss the practical implications of this for the 
process of measure construction. 
 
Causal Inference Under Multiple Versions of Treatment 
 
The theory for causal inference under multiple versions of treatment6,7 was originally 
developed to aid interpretation in settings in which there was no unambiguous intervention to 
manipulate a given exposure. In this setting, because different manipulations to shift the 
exposure might result in different effects on an outcome, the counterfactual or potential 
outcomes14-17 are not well-defined, and there is thus no single quantitative effect of the 
exposure.6,7,18,19  
Consider first the setting with unique well-defined exposure interventions. Let A denote 
the exposure, Y an outcome, and C a set of pre-exposure covariates. Let Ya denote the potential 
outcome for Y if exposure A had been set to value a. The causal effect of a binary exposure A on 
outcome Y is defined, for an individual, by 𝑌" − 𝑌$, and for the population by 𝐸[𝑌" − 𝑌$]. If the 
exposure is categorical or continuous, the values 1 and 0 can be replaced by arbitrary values, a 
and a*, respectively. We say that the effect of A on Y is unconfounded given C if Ya is 
independent of A conditional on C i.e. if, conditional on C, those with and without the exposure 
are comparable in their potential outcomes. If this is so and the technical consistency assumption 
holds, that when A=a then Y=Ya, then we have14-17: 
 𝐸[𝑌" − 𝑌$] = 𝐸 𝑌 𝐴 = 1, 𝑐 − 𝐸 𝑌 𝐴 = 0, 𝑐 𝑃 𝑐 .0  
 
The causal effect can thus be obtained by standardizing the observed outcome differences 
comparing the exposed and the unexposed, conditional on C, by the proportion in each stratum 
of C. In practice, this is often obtained by regression, for example regressing Y on (A,C): 
 𝐸 𝑌 𝑎, 𝑐 = 𝛽$ + 𝛽"𝑎 + 𝛽4′𝑐 
 
Provided the regression model is correctly specified, the causal effect is then given by: 𝐸[𝑌" −𝑌$] = 𝐸 𝑌 𝐴 = 1, 𝑐 − 𝐸 𝑌 𝐴 = 0, 𝑐 𝑃 𝑐0 = 𝛽". 
Now consider the setting wherein there is not a well-defined intervention on exposure A. 
Suppose there is some underlying “version of treatment” variable K that takes values among 
some set K, and that for each version of treatment kÎK, the version is sufficiently well-defined 
to correspond to a uniquely defined potential outcome Yk.6,18 Suppose that the investigator has 
access only to a coarsened variable A where each value of A corresponds to one or more values 
of K (i.e. the mapping from K to A is a many-to-one map). We might then refer to the variable A 
as a “composite exposure” or “compound treatment” since each value of A can come about 
through numerous more specific “versions of treatment” K.7,18,19 See Figure 1; the red arrows in 
this figure, and all subsequent figures, are those emanating from variables, related to the 
exposure, that are causally efficacious for the outcome. 
We will say there is no confounding for the effect of “version of treatment” K on 
outcome Y given C if Yk is independent of K conditional on C. We will say that the consistency 
assumption holds if when K=k then Y= Yk. Suppose the investigator has only information on 
coarsened exposure A, outcome Y, and covariates C. Analogous to the formula above, for 
comparing exposure levels A=a and A=a*, it may seem natural to compute: 𝐸 𝑌 𝐴 = 𝑎, 𝑐 − 𝐸 𝑌 𝐴 = 𝑎∗, 𝑐 𝑃 𝑐 .0  
However, it is not clear how to interpret this quantity when there are not well-defined 
interventions on A. Theory for multiple versions of treatment provides an interpretation.6,7 It can 
be shown6 that if the effect of K on outcome Y is unconfounded given C and if the consistency 
assumptions holds, then we have that 
 𝐸 𝑌 𝐴 = 𝑎, 𝑐 − 𝐸 𝑌 𝐴 = 𝑎∗, 𝑐 𝑃 𝑐0  = 𝐸 𝑌7 𝑐7,0 𝑃 𝑘 𝑎, 𝑐 𝑃 𝑐 − 𝐸 𝑌7 𝑐7,0 𝑃 𝑘 𝑎∗, 𝑐 𝑃 𝑐  
            (1) 
The first expression in equation 1 is simply the empirical quantity we would ordinarily use to 
estimate effects of A on Y, if multiple versions were not an issue. The second expression 
provides a causal interpretation. This second expression can be interpreted as a comparison in a 
hypothetical randomized trial in which, within strata of covariates C, each individual in one arm 
is randomly assigned a “version of treatment” K from the underlying distribution of K in the 
subpopulation with A=a and C=c, and each in the other arm is randomly assigned a “version of 
treatment” K from the underlying distribution of K in the subpopulation with A=a* and C=c. An 
illustration with BMI and mortality is given in the eAppendix. While the original theory6 
assumed A constituted a coarsened version of K so that the relationship between K and A was a 
deterministic many-to-one mapping, this assumption can be weakened. As shown in the 
Appendix, beyond unconfoundedness and consistency, the only assumption needed to derive the 
relation in 1 is that Y is independent of A conditional on (K,C) i.e. conditional on C, A gives no 
information about Y once K is known. With this weakening of assumptions, the relationship 
between K and A need not be many-to-one and can, moreover, also be stochastic. This will be 
important in the development that follows. 
The MVT theory allows us to make formal progress in interpreting causal effects of 
composite exposures. There are, however, limitations to this approach. First, when the set of 
versions of treatment, K, is unknown, this limits precise understanding of the interpretation. 
Second, with the set of underlying versions unknown, it would then effectively be impossible to 
implement the hypothetical randomized trials embedded within the interpretation. Third, the 
interpretation will vary depending on what is included in the measured covariates C since, once 
C is fixed, this may limit the range of potential “versions of treatment” that are possible. Fourth, 
with the versions of treatment unknown, it becomes difficult to substantively assess the 
unconfoundedness assumption and thus to know whether the proposed interpretation is 
reasonable. Although the MVT interpretation has limitations, it may be the best we can do with 
respect to a formal potential-outcomes based interpretation of the quantitative effect estimate of a 
composite exposure.18,19 In the next section, we will consider how this interpretation can be 
applied to measures arising from reflective or formative measurement models.8-13 
 
Causal Inference and Latent Variables: Reflective and Formative Models 
 
The classical model used in much measurement theory and scale development presupposes an 
underlying latent continuous variable h that gives rise to measured indicators (𝑋",… , 𝑋;) as in 
Figure 2a. After standardization, it is often assumed that each indicator Xi is given by a linear 
function of the latent variable h plus random error ei: 
 𝑋= = 𝜆=𝜂 + 𝜀= 
            (2) 
The random errors ei are often, but not always, assumed independent. This model forms the basis 
of much psychometric measure evaluation.20 However, after this evaluation is complete, the 
measures that are used in practice are generally just some function of the indicators (𝑋",… , 𝑋;). 
When the indicators are on the same scale, often their mean is used. Let 𝐴 = 𝑓(𝑋", … , 𝑋;) 
denote the measure employed. This is typically considered an imprecise measure of the 
underlying latent h that corresponds to the psychosocial construct of interest. Interest often then 
lies in assessing the relationship of this with various outcomes. 
To estimate effects, often a regression is fit of Y on (A,C), assuming relationships 
depicted in Figure 2b: 
 𝐸 𝑌 𝑎, 𝑐 = 𝛽$ + 𝛽"𝑎 + 𝛽4′𝑐 
 
Provided the covariates C control for confounding, the coefficient b1 is then sometimes 
interpreted as the causal effect of the exposure on the outcome. Sometimes, especially when 
structural equation models are used, this estimation is done with correction for measurement 
error, using reliabilities from the measurement model4 and the estimate is then interpreted as the 
causal effect of the latent variable h corresponding to the underlying construct. When the 
reliabilities li vary across indicators and this is neglected, as would often be the case if Y were 
simply regressed on (A,C), then this interpretation is problematic. However, even in this setting, 
a causal interpretation of b1 is possible using MVT theory. Specifically, if we replace K in the 
previous section with h, and compare measure level A=a+1 to A=a, then if the effect of h on Y 
is unconfounded given C, as in Figure 2b, equation 1 above becomes: 
 𝛽" = 𝐸 𝑌C 𝑐C,0 𝑃 𝜂 𝐴 = 𝑎 + 1, 𝑐 𝑃 𝑐 − 𝐸 𝑌C 𝑐C,0 𝑃 𝜂 𝐴 = 𝑎, 𝑐 𝑃 𝑐 . 
In other words, even if reliabilities li vary and this is ignored (as it often is), b1 can still be 
interpreted as a comparison in a hypothetical randomized trial in which, within strata of 
covariates C, individuals in one arm are randomized to a value of latent variable h from the 
actual distribution of h in the subpopulation with A=a+1 and C=c, and individuals in the other 
arm are randomized to a value of h from its actual distribution in the subpopulation with A=a 
and C=c. We can apply the result from equation 1 with K replaced by h because, in Figure 2b, 𝐴 = 𝑓(𝑋", … , 𝑋;) will be independent of Y conditioning on (h,C).15 Similar remarks concerning 
independence pertain to the other results considered below. 
 The model in Figure 2a is sometimes referred to as a reflective model because the 
indicators reflect the underlying latent variable. An alternative model for measurement is 
sometimes referred to as a formative model9-11 and is illustrated in Figure 3a. In this model, the 
indicators effectively together form the underlying variable of interest, which is a function of the 
indicators plus error:  𝜂 = 𝜆=𝑋= + 𝜀=  
            (3) 
In practice, measures are again formed as some function of the indicators 𝐴 = 𝑓(𝑋", … , 𝑋;). 
Sometimes it is assumed that there is no error, and the function of the indicators is itself the 
underlying variable of interest with 𝜂 = 𝐴 = 𝑓(𝑋", … , 𝑋;). Considerations as to whether and 
when reflective or formative models are more appropriate are described elsewhere, though this 
continues to be a matter of debate.9-13 
 However, in this case also the causal interpretation under MVT theory is applicable. 
Provided that the effect of h on Y is unconfounded given C, as in Figure 3b, then under the 
regression model 𝐸 𝑌 𝑎, 𝑐 = 𝛽$ + 𝛽"𝑎 + 𝛽4′𝑐 we again have: 𝛽" = 𝐸 𝑌C 𝑐C,0 𝑃 𝜂 𝐴 = 𝑎 + 1, 𝑐 𝑃 𝑐 − 𝐸 𝑌C 𝑐C,0 𝑃 𝜂 𝐴 = 𝑎, 𝑐 𝑃 𝑐  
and b1 can be interpreted as it was under the reflective model.  
 However, this analysis of reflective and formative models assumed that the latent 
variable h was causally efficacious. This may not be the case. Nothing in Figures 2a and 3a, nor 
in equations 2 and 3 require that it is h, rather than (𝑋",… , 𝑋;), that is causally efficacious. 
Consider instead the causal diagrams in Figures 4a and 4b. These correspond to reflective and 
formative models but with indicators (𝑋",… , 𝑋;), rather than the latent h, having causal effects 
on outcome Y. Importantly, the causal diagram in Figure 4a is entirely compatible with the 
reflective model in Figure 2a and with equation 2. Likewise, the causal diagrams in Figure 4b is 
entirely compatible with the formative model in Figure 3a and equation 3. We might thus 
distinguish between basic reflective and formative models represented in Figures 2a and 3a 
respectively (and by equations 2 and 3), versus what we might call structural15,21 reflective and 
formative models, represented by Figures 2b and 3b respectively, which additionally assume that 
all causal relations with (𝑋",… , 𝑋;) are through h (reflective)15,21 or that all effects of 
(𝑋",… , 𝑋;) are through h (formative). Importantly, again, both the structural models in Figures 
2b and 3b, and also the models in Figures 4a and 4b (with indicators being causally efficacious), 
are compatible with the basic formative and reflective in Figures 2a and 3a. 
In the causal models in Figures 4a and 4b, we might consider the effects of each indicator 
one-by-one. However, we might also still instead consider measures formed as functions of the 
indicators 𝐴 = 𝑓(𝑋", … , 𝑋;). If we regress the outcome Y on (A,C) using 𝐸 𝑌 𝑎, 𝑐 = 𝛽$ +
𝛽"𝑎 + 𝛽4′𝑐, we can again interpret the coefficient b1 using MVT theory, this time by taking K to 
be the whole set of indicators (𝑋",… , 𝑋;). In both Figures 4a and 4b, the effects of (𝑋",… , 𝑋;) 
on Y are unconfounded conditional on C. For any two values A=a+1 and A=a, we can thus 
interpret b1 by equation 1 with 𝐾 = (𝑋", … , 𝑋;)	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝐴 = 𝑓(𝑋", … , 𝑋;). The coefficient b1 can 
thus be interpreted as a comparison in a hypothetical randomized trial wherein, within strata of 
covariates C, individuals in one arm are randomly assigned to values of (𝑋",… , 𝑋;) from the 
actual distribution of these indicators in the subpopulation with (A=a+1,C=c), and individuals in 
the other arm are randomly assigned to values of (𝑋",… , 𝑋;) from the actual distribution of these 
indicators in the subpopulation with (A=a,C=c). The MVT interpretation is again applicable. 
However, now the interpretation extends to hypothetical interventions on the indicator set 
(𝑋",… , 𝑋;), rather than the underlying latent h. 
We are left with the question of which of these causal models is most reasonable. 
Compatibility of the data with Figure 2a and equation 2, or with Figure 3a and equation 3, tells 
us nothing as to whether the indicators themselves, or some underlying latent variable, is 
causally efficacious. The next section presents analyses concerning associations between social 
integration and health suggesting that, in this case, a model with causally efficacious indicators is 
more adequate. Notably, structural formative and reflective models are incompatible with one of 
the indicators having causal effects on the outcome and another not, because, under the structural 
models, that could only be the case if one of the li were 0, in which case it would not be part of 
the underlying latent variable h at all. 
 
Social Integration Example: Questioning the Measurement Models 
 
 Numerous studies have examined associations between measures of social integration 
and subsequent health. Social integration has been conceptualized and measured in a variety of 
ways.22,23 However, evidence has been consistent across operationalizations that social 
participation tends to be associated with better health.22  
 Chang et al.24 used data from the Nurses Health Study (n=76,362) to examine 
associations between social integration and incident coronary heart disease (CHD). They used 
the simplified Berkman-Syme Social Integration Index in 1992 as their exposure (summing 
indicators, each scored 0-3, of religious service attendance, community group participation, 
number of close friends, and marital status), and followed incident CHD through 2014, 
employing proportional hazards models. After adjusting for age, education, husband’s education, 
census-tract income, hypertension, diabetes, cholesterol, family MI history, and depressive 
symptoms, comparing highest versus lowest quartiles of social integration, they estimate the 
hazard ratio as HR=0.79 (95%CI:0.70,0.88). Under the assumption of unconfoundedness, this 
association could potentially be interpreted under the MVT theory above. However, Chang et 
al.24 also consider associations with each social integration indicator. They report evidence for an 
association between attending religious service more than once per week and lower CHD 
(HR=0.82; 95%CI:0.72,0.93), but no evidence for an association with other indicators, which all 
have point estimates close to HR=1. They report that associations are similar after adjusting for 
all indicators simultaneously. Similar conclusions were reached by Li et al.25 and VanderWeele 
et al.26 examining associations of social integration with all-cause mortality and suicide, 
respectively, with religious service attendance manifesting the strongest, or only, associations 
among the components (marriage was also protectively, but more weakly, associated with 
mortality).25 Of course, the longitudinal associations of these various indicators may differ with 
other outcomes such as happiness, income, prejudice, autonomy, etc. However, the present 
analyses suggest that we should be wary of assuming that “social integration” has a well-defined 
effect on a given outcome. From these prior analyses, there is evidence that the various 
indicators are differentially associated with outcomes as in Figure 4. The structural formative 
model with a univariate latent is unlikely to hold. 
 
Further Critique of the Assumption of an Underlying Univariate Latent Variable in 
Reflective Models 
 
The assumption of a univariate causally relevant latent variable is strong and will often 
not correspond to reality. For reflective models, the assumption is sometimes defended on the 
grounds of factor analyses suggesting a unidimensional latent variable suffices to explain the 
covariance structure among the indicators. But this does not entail a structural interpretation. The 
univariate factor model fitting a set of indicators (represented in Figure 2a and Equation 2) is 
consistent with a structural interpretation (Figure 2b) or with the latent being inert and the 
indicators being causally efficacious (Figure 4a). The goodness of fit of a unidimensional factor 
model in Figure 2a and Equation 2 tells us nothing about which of these causal models is a better 
representation of reality. Factor analysis may be useful in generating hypotheses about 
underlying causally efficacious univariate latent variables, but do nothing to establish this. 
The structural interpretation of a reflective model is in fact also empirically testable.21 A 
structural interpretation would imply that randomized interventions to alter the latent h had 
effects on the various indicators, Xi, that were proportionate to their reliabilities li, which can be 
tested.21 The structural reflective model is also incompatible with one indicator having an 
association with an outcome, and another not, which can also be tested.21 The application of such 
tests to prominent scales, such as the Satisfaction with Life Scale27 indicates that the structural 
interpretation can be rejected: 4 of 5 indicators are associated with all-cause mortality, but one 
indicator, “If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing” is not.21 We should be 
wary of assuming that a structural factor model always holds. 
This does not imply the measure is bad, or that the basic univariate model is a bad fit for 
the covariance. The lack of a structural interpretation furthermore does not threaten the use of the 
scale as an outcome. Provided the users of the scale equally value the individual indicators as 
outcomes, it is reasonable to take their average. Considered in this way, this average might then 
effectively be viewed as an index. Similar comments likewise pertain to other measures taken as 
outcomes. The interpretation of constructed measures as outcomes is arguably easier than as 
exposures. However, even as exposures, and even when the univaraite structural interpretation 
fails, the interpretation given by MVT theory is still applicable. However, when used as an 
exposure, we must be careful, as even the MVT interpretation obscures the differential 
associations across indicators and obscures our capacity to discern the most relevant underlying 
constituents of reality. The indicators themselves are differentially associated with all-cause 
mortality. There is no underlying univariate causally efficacious latent variable. 
Similar remarks might well pertain to numerous other scales as well. The assumption of 
an underlying univariate structural factor is generally just presumed, not tested. Associations 
between different indicators and outcomes are rarely examined. The presumption of a univariate 
structural latent variable may well unrealistic in numerous other cases as well.   
 
 
Towards More Complex Models 
 
 From the analyses above, Figure 4 seems a better representation of reality than the 
structural reflective and formative models in Figures 2b and 3b. However, undoubtedly, even 
Figure 4 is a gross simplification. Concerning social integration, each indicator for marital status, 
community group participation, number of close friends, and religious service attendance 
corresponds to a more complex reality. Quality of marriages vary; religious services can differ 
dramatically in content; community groups vary from arts to sports to card games. Thus, each 
indicator captures only aspects of a more complex reality, as in Figure 5, wherein the indicators 
Xi each arise from a multidimensional underlying latent hi. Models like this have been 
considered previously assuming univariate hi.12 But is it reasonable to assume each hi is 
univariate? Religious services vary in length of time, in discursive content, in style of worship, in 
demands made by participants, etc. Even the assumption that the “latent” behind a single 
indicator is univariate may be wrong. Nevertheless, the MVT interpretation of associations 
between measures A and outcome Y in terms of hypothetical randomized trials on h =(h", … ,h;) would still be applicable under Figure 5, and even so if each multivariate hi affected 
the entire set (𝑋",… , 𝑋;), but the assumption of univariate latents hi would be unjustified. 
 Additionally, the indicators themselves may vary over time; there will likely also be 
causal relations between the different aspects of the underlying reality (e.g. of social integration). 
Models representing this, either with only the indicators themselves, or with underlying latents 
also, are given in Figures 6 and 7, respectively. In these figures, several things become apparent. 
First, if control is not made for all indicators simultaneously then the associations of one 
indicator may confound that of another. For example, in Figure 6, suppose there were no effect 
of 𝑋"H on Y; if we do not control for 𝑋;H  in a regression of Y on 𝑋"H, we might observe an 
association between the two simply because 𝑋;HI" affects 𝑋"H, and 𝑋;HI" also affects 𝑋;H  which 
affects Y. Second, the use of an indicator at a single time-point may be capturing, however 
crudely, the associations of an entire history or trajectory of social participation. If we do use a 
single composite measure that is a function of the indicators at a single time-point 𝐴 =𝑓(𝑋"H, … , 𝑋;H), then if temporally prior levels of these indicators (𝑋"HI", … , 𝑋;HI") are causally 
related to the outcome Y independent of (𝑋"H, … , 𝑋;H), either directly (Figure 6) or through the 
latents (Figure 7), then the associations between A and Y may also partially reflect associations 
of the outcome with past indicators (𝑋"HI", … , 𝑋;HI"). Third, considerations of confounding 
control must take into account the time-varying nature of the indicators (and/or latents). The 
MVT interpretation of causal effects requires control of confounding for the underlying 
“versions-of-treatment” variable K. If K corresponds to a historical trajectory, its time-varying 
nature must be accounted for in confounding control. Unfortunately, confounding considerations 
become more complex with time-varying exposures28,29 and if confounders can themselves be 
affected by prior exposure levels, traditional regression-based adjustment for confounding fails; 
more sophisticated models are needed.28,29  A possibly attractive alternative is using the 
indicators at time t in the analysis, while simultaneously controlling for past values of the 
indicators (along with confounders C) at time t-1.29,30 This proposal and its interpretation are 




Towards a New Model of Measure Construction: Constructs, Indicators, Measures, and the 
Underlying Constituents of Reality 
 
 Abstracting yet further from the diagrams above (and setting aside the conditioning 
variables), there is arguably some complex underlying reality (R in Figure 8). Certain aspects of 
this constitute exposure states h related to the construct of interest. The complex multi-
dimensional variable h takes values in some set K, each member of which defines a potential 
outcome for outcome Y. The variable h corresponds to the “version-of-treatment” variable K in 
the MVT theory, but we must keep in mind h is multivariate, not univariate. This complex multi-
dimensional variable h gives rise to a set of observed indicators (𝑋", … , 𝑋;), from which we 
form measures 𝐴 = 𝑓(𝑋", … , 𝑋;), either as a mean, or some other function arising from measure 
development processes and psychometric evaluation. We use either the indicators (𝑋", … , 𝑋;) or 
the summary measure A in analyses and examine associations with outcomes of interest, Y, 
controlling for other covariates, and possibly past values of (𝑋", … , 𝑋;), or A, as appropriate. 
 Concurrent with these processes giving rise to indicators and measures, is the process by 
which we form our concepts and constructs. The underlying constituents of reality, and our 
living as human persons within communities, gives rise to our language and the concepts 
embedded within it. In order to try to systematize and study various aspects of the underlying 
reality, we propose constructs. Such constructs characteristically involve the systemization and 
reduction of our ideas, language, and concepts so as to operationalize them for use in specific 
modes of reasoning. These two parallel processes are represented diagrammatically in Figure 8. 
In constructing measures, we hope that our measures correspond to our constructs. 
 The dominant measurement models – the reflective models in Figure 2 and formative 
models in Figure 3 – each capture aspects of these processes, but each arguably fails to 
acknowledge important features. Formative approaches get right that our measures are always 
functions of our indicators. Our measure of social integration is formed by our indicators; it is 
not that there is an underlying true univariate “social integration” that itself causes the indicators. 
However, formative models misconstrue the relationship between our measures and the 
underlying reality to be studied. It is not that our measures, formed by the indicators, constitute 
(possibly subject to error) the underlying reality to be studied (as in Figure 3). It is the underlying 
reality that gives rise to our indicators by which we form measures. 
Reflective models, in contrast, get right the fact that our measured indicators do not cause 
the relevant constituents of reality under study, but rather are caused by, or reflective of, these 
features. However, reflective models are wrong in equating the relevant aspects of reality with a 
univariate latent variable that corresponds to our construct.31-33 There is no underlying univariate 
latent variable that corresponds to our construct, say, of intelligence, such that “true intelligence” 
gives rise to the measured indicators. The underlying reality corresponding to our constructs is 
far more complex than a univariate latent variable. Models that use multiple latent 
variables12,Figure-5 more closely correspond to the actual underlying processes but still wrongly 
equate reality to a few univariate latents. 
Thus, even in paradigmatic cases of the formative model, such as social integration 
(indicators causing the measure i.e. concerning which there is no true underlying social 
integration variable that “causes” the indicators), the underlying reality is nevertheless more 
complex than the social integration measure. Likewise, even in paradigmatic cases of the 
reflective model such as intelligence (the supposed construct causing the indicators, i.e. 
concerning which the indicators of test responses do not “cause” intelligence), it is still the case 
that the underlying reality is again more complex than a single univariate general intelligence 
latent variable.33,34 In both cases, a complex underlying reality gives rise to our indicators from 
which we form measures. This is true even if we develop those measures based on psychometric 
approaches, such as factor analysis, arising from reflective models. Even then, the measures are 
still ultimately functions of the indicators, as in Figure 8. If we lose sight of that fact, we may 
forget that certain indicators, corresponding to particular aspects of the underlying reality, may in 
fact be differentially related to our outcomes of interest (as in Figures 4-7). 
These issues likewise pertain to distinctions drawn between “scales” with closely related 
items (supposedly corresponding to reflective models) and “indices” with items that are 
conceptually distinct but somehow together constitute the construct of interest (often thought to 
correspond to formative models). The model for measure construction given in Figure 8 is 
arguably applicable to both scales and indices. In both cases, a complex underlying reality gives 
rise to item responses from which we form measures. The relations between the underlying 
processes and the formation of measures may thus be more similar for scales and indices than 
typically thought. Whether a measure is considered a scale or index may have more to do with 
the items used to construct the measure, and the use of that measure, than with the definition of 
the construct itself. While life satisfaction is often assessed as a “scale” with several related 
subjective indicators27, if the construct is instead assessed by life domain (work, family, health, 
finances, etc.)35,36 the measure will resemble an index. Conversely, while measures of social 
integration are often assessed by domain (marital status, time with friends, religious community, 
etc.)22,23, total social integration could alternatively be assessed with a series of related subjective 
indicators as in Duke’s Subjective Social Support subscale.37 In all these cases, a complex 
underlying reality gives rise to indicators by which we form measures. It is the conceptual 
relations between the items and the construct that differs, not the model of measurement per se. 
All measures are formative in that they are ultimately formed from observed indicators; 
all measures are reflective in that they are reflective of a more complex underlying reality. The 
fallacy of the formative model is that the relevant underlying reality is made up of a function of 
our indicators; the fallacy of the reflective model is the supposition that we have imperfectly 
measured an underlying univariate latent variable.  
 
Implications and Conclusions 
 
The dominance of the reflective model, and the fallacious presumption that the basic 
univariate factor model fitting the indicators well implies a structural interpretation, gives rise to 
the illusion that, in most settings, there truly is an underlying univariate latent variable 
adequately representing reality.21,38 There is no reason in general to assume this is true. But this 
presumption and illusion has arguably led to a related series of other subtle subsequent mistakes 
and missteps in measure construction and measurement conceptualization.  
It has been argued elsewhere that current factor analysis and measure construction 
practices (generally presuming there is a structural univariate latent) have led to the conflation of 
the terms “construct” and “latent variable.”32,39 Indeed the very term “latent construct” 
effectively entails the equating of a conceptual specification with a quantitative variable, 
generally presuming a univariate structure. We need a clear distinction between concepts and 
constructs, their underlying referents (h), and our attempts to measure these underlying referents (𝑋", … , 𝑋;).32,39 The conflation of “construct” and “variable,” and the presumption of a 
univariate underlying reality has also led to a notion that the nature of the concept is to be 
discovered empirically from analyses of correlations.32 Items are proposed, factor analyses 
implemented, and it is assumed we somehow thereby come to understand the meaning of the 
construct itself. This view has in turn has often led to a lack of formal definitions given for the 
construct under consideration32, since, so it is thought, this is to be “discovered” empirically. 
While plenty of theory is often provided, formal definitions are rare.  
The lack of definitions in turn obscures the relationship between items and the construct. 
Items that are necessary or sufficient or merely illustrative of the construct are treated 
interchangeably; none are related to definitions themselves. Without definitions, it becomes 
difficult to assess whether two different measures of allegedly the same construct are indeed 
intended to assess the same thing, or whether authors have different understandings of the 
construct, or whether both implicitly view the nature of the construct as something to be 
discovered empirically and are just beginning from different places. The lack of definitions also 
tends to lead to overly broad inclusion of items within measures. Not infrequently, conceptually 
distant but desirable outcomes are placed among the items (e.g. “I’ve been pretty successful in 
life” in Synder’s hope scale40; or taking “Pride in your achievements” in the Connor-Davidson 
resilience scale41). Without definitions, criticism is more difficult; often these items are simply 
accepted, provided a univariate factor model accounts for covariances among indicators. 
Moreover, since the underlying factor is presumed univariate, item-by-item analyses, which 
might uncover differential relationships with outcomes, are rare, thereby further obscuring the 
important conceptual and empirical distinctions that may be present among the items. 
Much of this would benefit from change, beginning with clear definitions of the 
construct.42 Proposed items should then be derived from the definitions, with an understanding of 
their relationship, and whether items do or do not make use of the word corresponding to the 
construct; whether the items are necessary, sufficient, necessary and sufficient, or merely 
illustrative for the construct; or whether items are intended to capture different facets of the 
underlying construct. The work of analytic philosophy may be of use both in this task, and in 
clarifying different uses of our language and thereby facilitating particular definitions of the 
construct in view.43-45 Various measures can be proposed from item indicators on conceptual 
grounds. Factor analyses1-4 may be useful to assess approximate covariance dimensionality, but 
indication of unidimensional factor structure is neither necessary nor sufficient for using a 
univariate measure in analysis. It is not necessary because associations between constructed 
measures and outcomes can still admit a causal interpretation under the MVT theory6 above. It is 
not sufficient because even if the basic univariate factor model fits, the causal interpretation of 
the latent may not be structural.21 Regardless of the fit of the unidimensional model, it will still 
be useful to carry out item-by-item analyses, either to potentially provide some evidence for a 
structural univariate latent interpretation, or alternatively to uncover important distinctions 
between items that may be relevant in refining measure construction and in thinking about 
interventions.  
In summary, a preliminary outline of what I believe to be a more accurate and adequate 
model of the process of measure construction might be described as follows: A complex 
underlying reality includes causally relevant (and generally multi-dimensional) constituents 
related to the construct, and from these we assess various indicators and construct our measures. 
From this complex underlying reality, our language and concepts also emerge, from which we 
propose more precisely defined constructs. Our empirical analyses of associations between 
measures, or indicators, and our outcomes are reflective of the relationships between the causally 
relevant constituents of reality and the outcomes of interest. When data permit, examining 
associations with each indicator one-by-one may give further insight into the causally relevant 
constituents of reality. In some cases, a structural interpretation of a univariate factor model may 
be justified, but without examining associations with individual indicators one-by-one, we have 
very little evidence of this. Even when the causally relevant constituents of reality are multi-
dimensional, and a univariate measure is used in analysis, we can still potentially interpret its 
association with outcomes using theory for multiple versions of treatment, though the 
interpretation is obscured by the extent to which we do not have a clear sense of the causally 
relevant constituents of reality. We need a better formalization to map our conceptual constructs 
to our items, indicators, and constructed measures. Obscuring that mapping by presuming an 
underlying causally relevant univariate latent variable will likely only impede our understanding 
and knowledge and, in this regard, the reflective and formative measurement models are 
inadequate. We need to move towards a new model of measurement for psychosocial constructs 
that better respects the relationships between our constructs, items, indicators, measures, and the 
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Causal Effects Under Multiple Versions of Treatment 
 
The derivation here follows the structure of the proof of Proposition 8 given by VanderWeele 
and Hernán6 but under weaker assumptions, requiring only that (i) Y is independent of A 
conditional on (K,C); (ii) the effect of K on Y is unconfounded given C i.e. Yk is independent of 
K given C; and (iii) the consistency assumption that when K=k then Yk=Y. Under these 
assumptions we then have that: 
 𝐸 𝑌 𝐴 = 𝑎, 𝑐 − 𝐸 𝑌 𝐴 = 𝑎∗, 𝑐 𝑃 𝑐0  = 𝐸 𝑌 𝑘, 𝑎, 𝑐7,0 𝑃 𝑘 𝑎, 𝑐 𝑃 𝑐 − 𝐸 𝑌 𝑘, 𝑎∗, 𝑐7,0 𝑃 𝑘 𝑎∗, 𝑐 𝑃 𝑐  = 𝐸 𝑌 𝑘, 𝑐7,0 𝑃 𝑘 𝑎, 𝑐 𝑃 𝑐 − 𝐸 𝑌 𝑘, 𝑐7,0 𝑃 𝑘 𝑎∗, 𝑐 𝑃 𝑐  = 𝐸 𝑌7 𝑘, 𝑐7,0 𝑃 𝑘 𝑎, 𝑐 𝑃 𝑐 − 𝐸 𝑌7 𝑘, 𝑐7,0 𝑃 𝑘 𝑎∗, 𝑐 𝑃 𝑐  = 𝐸 𝑌7 𝑐7,0 𝑃 𝑘 𝑎, 𝑐 𝑃 𝑐 − 𝐸 𝑌7 𝑐7,0 𝑃 𝑘 𝑎∗, 𝑐 𝑃 𝑐  
 
where the first equality follows from the law of iterated expectations, the second from the 
























eAppendix for “Causal inference and constructed measures: towards a new model of 
measurement for psychosocial constructs” 
 
Example of Causal Inference Under Multiple Versions of Treatment: BMI and Mortality 
 
One paradigmatic example to which multiple version of treatment (MVT) theory is 
applicable concerns attempts to assess the effect of being overweight or alternatively of obese, 
assessed by body mass index (BMI), on e.g. 10-year mortality risk.6,7 There is no unique 
hypothetical intervention on BMI. One might accomplish a change in BMI from 30 to 25 by 
exercise, or dietary changes, or surgery, or through other means. Each of these might have very 
different effects on mortality risk. It then becomes difficult to speak unambiguously of the effect 
of BMI on mortality. The theory of causal inference under multiple versions of treatment was 
intended to provide a more precise interpretation of quantitative causal effect estimates in 
settings like this.6,7 
Consider the setting in which A=1 corresponds to BMI=30 and A=0 corresponds to 
BMI=25 and Y is mortality after 10 years. In the case of BMI, a particular “version of treatment” 
k might correspond to a particular set of life-style choices from study entry onwards, which 
would in turn lead to a particular level of BMI. 
To illustrate and make more concrete this interpretation, consider data analyses presented 
by Bhaskaran et al. (2018). In their paper, they used UK primary care data on 3.6 million persons 
from the Clinical Practice Research Datalink (CPRD), linked to national files outcomes from 
January 1998 through March 2016. For never-smokers aged 16 and above, they used 
proportional hazards models for mortality, modeling BMI with splines and additionally 
controlling for baseline age, sex, alcohol use, diabetes, socioeconomic status, and calendar 
period. Their estimated hazard ratio comparing BMI=30 to BMI=25 was HR = 1.21 (95% CI: 
1.20, 1.22). As noted above, there is no well-defined intervention on BMI. The underlying 
“versions of treatment” K for each person may correspond here to a complex trajectory of 
lifestyle choices that brings an individual to a particular BMI upon study entry. Full information 
on such lifestyle trajectories is of course unavailable in the data and it is effectively impossible to 
even fully enumerate all the possible trajectories. However, by the MVT result in the text, if we 
were willing to assume that the covariates in the model controlled for confounding of the effect 
of version of treatment on the outcome, then we could still potentially interpret the HR=1.21 
using the MVT theory. The estimate HR of 1.21 would then correspond to the hazard ratio we 
would obtain in a hypothetical randomized trial which, within strata of covariates C, the 
participants in one arm are further each randomly assigned a lifestyle trajectory “version of 
treatment” K from the actual distribution of K in the subpopulation with BMI=30 and C=c, and 
in the other arm, persons are instead further randomly assigned a lifestyle trajectory “version of 
treatment” K from the actual distribution of K in the subpopulation with BMI=25 and C=c. 
In many analyses of BMI, it is categories of BMI (e.g. 20-25 versus 25-30) that are 
compared, rather than actual values of BMI (e.g. BMI=30 versus BMI=25). The MVT theory can 
also be applied to categories of the exposure variable using a nested randomization. For example, 
if A=1 corresponded to BMI in the range of 25-30 and A=0 corresponded to BMI in the range of 
20-25, then the estimate under the MVT theory could be interpreted as follows. Assuming the 
covariates controlled for confounding, the estimate would correspond to the hazard ratio we 
would obtain in a hypothetical randomized trial which, within strata of covariates C, the 
participants in one arm were first each randomly assigned to a BMI value between 25 and 30 
according to the distribution of BMI between 25 and 30 from the actual subpopulation with BMI 
in the range 25-30 and covariates C=c and then further randomly assigned a lifestyle trajectory 
“version of treatment” K from the actual distribution of K in the subpopulation with C=c and the 
level of BMI to which they had been assigned; and in the other arm, persons would instead be 
randomly assigned to a BMI value between 20 and 25 according to the actual distribution of BMI 
between 20 and 25 from the subpopulation with BMI in the range 20-25 and covariates C=c and 
then further randomly assigned a lifestyle trajectory “version of treatment” K from the actual 
distribution of K in the subpopulation with C=c and the level of BMI to which they had been 
assigned. The MVT interpretation would still potentially be applicable but becomes yet more 
complex. 
Likewise, in the social integration example given in the paper, the MVT interpretation 
would require nested randomization wherein, within strata of covariates C=c, for a given social 
integration quantile, the participants would be randomized to a value of the components of social 
integration (religious service attendance, community group participation, number of close 
friends, and marital status) according to the actual distribution of the components in that quantile 
among those with C=c, but then would be further randomized to a set of life choices and 
relationship trajectories K (including e.g. quality of relationship, type of community, style of 
religious service etc., represented by multi-dimensional h in Figures 5 and 7) drawn from the 
actual distribution of these “versions of treatment” K among the subpopulation with actual levels 
of religious service attendance, community group participation, number of close friends, and 
marital status that they were hypothetically randomized to and with covariates C=c. 
As discussed in the text, even the MVT interpretation will vary depending on what is 
included in the measured covariates C. For example, suppose in the context of BMI, exercise was 
included in the measured covariates C that were adjusted for in the analysis. In this case, because 
the hypothetical randomized trial in the interpretation is stratified by the measured covariates C, 
distribution of lifestyle trajectory “version of treatment” variable K will no longer vary by 
exercise across the BMI arms (or by whatever aspect of it is captured by the measured covariate) 
because the hypothetical randomized trial is effectively stratified by exercise. 
 
Analysis and Interpretation of Associations with Time-Varying Indicators or Latents 
 
As noted in the text, in the context of time-varying indicators or latents, a possibly 
attractive analysis alternative is using the indicators at time t as the exposure, while 
simultaneously controlling for past values of the indicators (along with confounders C) at time t-
1.29,30 At least in Figure 6 this has the advantage of simplifying confounding control to avoid the 
potential complications arising from time-dependent confounding. The associations between the 
time t indicators are then more easily interpreted as corresponding to the effects of present 
exposure on the outcomes. Moreover, control for prior exposure levels can help rule out reverse 
causation by prior outcome29,30 and potentially help rule out residual unmeasured confounding, 
since an unmeasured confounder would have to substantially affect current exposure through 
pathways independent of prior exposure to generate considerable bias. These remarks pertain 
directly to Figure 6 with causally efficacious indicators, or approximately in Figure 7, to the 
extent that the indictors capture what is causally relevant in the underlying reality with respect to 
the outcome Y. Unfortunately, relatively large sample sizes will be needed to deal with the 
potential collinearity arising between current and prior exposure levels, especially if the 
individual indicators themselves are being used. In cases of tens of thousands of participants, as 
in the Nurses’ Health Study above, this may be possible. The analyses of Li et al.25 and 
VanderWeele et al.26 discussed in the text in fact did control for past exposure levels.  
 In summary, to obtain the cleanest possible interpretation of causal effect estimates, it 
may be desirable to regress outcome Y on the individual indicators, along with past values of 
these indicators, and potentially confounding covariates. Associations with summary measures 
might still be interpreted as under the MVT theory but, as seen in the social integration example, 
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Figure 1. A model for multiple versions of treatment wherein the version-of-treatment variable K 
affects the outcome Y but is confounded by measured covariates C, with the measured exposure 
variable A representing a coarsening of K. [Red arrows in this figure and in all subsequent 
figures are those emanating from variables related to the exposure that are causally efficacious 
for the outcome.] 
 
Figure 2a. Basic reflective model with univariate latent variable h giving rise to indicators 
(𝑋",… , 𝑋;).  
Figure 2b. Structural reflective model with measure A as a function of the indicators 𝐴 = 𝑓(𝑋", … , 𝑋;) and with all causal relations concerning the indicators from prior variables C, 
or outcomes variables Y operating through latent variable h. 
 
Figure 3a. Basic formative model with the indicators (𝑋",… , 𝑋;) giving rise to a univariate latent 
variable h.  
Figure 3b. Structural formative model with all causal relations with subsequent outcomes 
variables Y operating through latent variable h. 
 
Figure 4a. Basic reflective model but with the causal relations from prior variables C or 
outcomes Y operating directing through the indicators (𝑋",… , 𝑋;) rather than the latent h. 
Figure 4b. Basic formative model but with causal effects of the indicators (𝑋",… , 𝑋;) on 
outcome Y not through the latent h. 
 
Figure 5. Multidimensional latent model where each indicator 𝑋= used in forming measure A 
arising from a potentially multidimensional latent variable h= which is causally efficacious for 
outcome Y. [Measured covariates C have been omitted for diagrammatic simplicity] 
 
Figure 6. A model depicting the indicators, 𝑋=H used to form measures A, themselves changing 
over time and causally affecting one another and the outcome Y [Measured covariates C have 
been omitted for diagrammatic simplicity] 
 
Figure 7. A model depicting potentially multivariate latents h=H giving rise to indicators 𝑋=H from 
which the measure A is formed, with the latents themselves changing over time and affecting one 
another as well as the outcome Y [Measured covariates C have been omitted for diagrammatic 
simplicity] 
 
Figure 8. A proposed new model of measure construction wherein complex underlying reality, R 
contains certain aspects of this reality (represented by the multi-dimensional variable h) relevant 
to the construct. These relevant aspects of reality give rise to a set of observed indicators (𝑋", … , 𝑋;), from which we might also form a measure A. [The dotted arrows, while in some 
sense causal, with the underlying reality giving rise to our language and concepts from which we 
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